Christine korsgaard the sources of normativity pdf
I begin by contrasting the rationalist account to two others, "subjectivism' and "objectivism.' Subjectivism identifies good ends with or by reference to some psychological state. Korsgaard When you address a claim or a demand to someone, expecting him to respond to that claim as one that gives him a reason for action, you are attempting to issue what Stephen Darwall calls a second-personal reason.
We miss its full significance, he argues, if we cast it as a demure retreat from ontology to epistemology (14, 25). Christine Korsgaard is the Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University. Christine Marion Korsgaard (born 1952) is an American philosopher and academic whose main scholarly interests are in moral philosophy and its history; the relation of issues in moral philosophy to issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of personal identity; the theory of personal relationships; and in normativity in general. The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues that in order to avoid the threat of moral skep-ticism, our moral theories must show how the claims they make about the nature of our actions obligate us to act morally. Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, 1996) is a collection of her essays on Kant’s ethics and Kantian ethics. i A good place to start is by stepping back from an approach that has us think in terms of the question of normativity. This paper should reflect a serious engagement with Christine Korsgaard’s Sources of Normativity. The problem of normativity is not as formidable as the contemporary philosophical debate would lead us to believe.
For instance, Christine Korsgaard’s account of the sources of normativity, where reflective endorsement plays such an important role, is usually considered as Kantian, qualified perhaps as existentialist Kantian, and not as existentialist or even as Kantian existentialist. The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, 1996), an expanded version of her 1992 Tanner Lectures, examines the history of ideas about the foundations of obligation in modern moral philosophy and presents an account of her own. In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard gives an account of the force that various claims (e.g., obligations, demands) can possess for us. She puts forth a thesis in Sources of Normativity in which she tries to address and solve the normative problem.
There are many, many reasons to read this great book.
Her initial account of reasons seems to make them dependent upon the practical identity of the agent, and upon the value the agent must place on her own humanity. In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues for the moral status of animals and our obligations to them. I find her notion of ‘reflective’ very similar to cognitive scientists’, but not the same. The Sources of Normativity PDF ð The Sources MOBI :Ð Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative They make claims on us they command, oblige, recommend, or guide But where does their authority over us come from Christine Korsgaard identifies and examines four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers voluntarism, realism, reflec. The Sources of Normativity MOBI á The Sources Epub / Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative They make claims on us they command, oblige, recommend, or guide But where does their authority over us come from Christine Korsgaard identifies and examines four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers voluntarism, realism, reflective .
Korsgaard quotes Showing 1-8 of 8 “There is something splendid about innocence; but what is bad about it, in turn, is that it cannot protect itself very well and is easily seduced. Professor Christine Korsgaard will give the Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture on March 16 at the University College London. of practical identity, which is the original contribution of Christine Korsgaard in search of the sources of normativity and the nature of a moral obligation. This dissertation will start from the historical overview of the normativity, following the genesis of the idea of normativity from the perspective of the great traditions that shaped the history of moral philosophy. Christine Korsgaard seeks in her book, The Sources of Normativity, to answer the question of moral motivation and difference between morality and normativity by appealing to what she calls practical identity.
This book follows hard upon Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity.
Her work focuses on moral philosophy and its history, as well as the theory of personal identity. Christine Marion Korsgaard (born April 9, 1952) is an American philosopher and academic whose main scholarly interests are in moral philosophy and its history; the relation of issues in moral philosophy to issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of personal identity; the theory of personal relationships; and in normativity in general. Search for more articles by this author PDF; Add to favorites; Download Citations; Track Citations; Permissions; Reprints; Share on. Moral philosophy aspires to understand the fact that human actions, unlike the actions of the other animals, can be morally good or bad. Korsgaard then goes on to complain that realism does not and cannot answer this question. Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. In laying out her theory for the source of normativity, Christine Korsgaard attempts to be inclusive by integrating her own variations on voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and appeal to autonomy.
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In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues that in order to avoid the threat of moral skepticism, our moral theories must show how the claims they make about the nature of our actions obligate us to act morally. In this paper I explore the possibility of explaining why there is such a thing as the good in naturalistic terms. Christine Korsgaard identifies and examines four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers--voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy--and shows how Kant's autonomy-based account emerges as a synthesis of the other three. For morality, Korsgaard observes, makes extensive and radical demands of us, sometimes requiring even that we surrender our lives. Korsgaard’s account of normativity, however, has received its fair share of attention. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources which agents use to navigate their practical identities. Korsgaard THREE KINDS OF VALUE THEORY In this paper I discuss what I will call a "rationalist" account of the goodness of ends. She has published extensively on Kant, and about moral philosophy and its history, the theory of practical reason, the philosophy of action, and personal identity.
For Korsgaard, the capacity to be an autonomous agent, i.e.
She is identified with a small group of philosophers who are intent on producing a version of Kant's moral philosophy that is at once sensitive to its historical roots while revealing its particular relevance to contemporary problems. FREEDOM AND THE SOURCE OF VALUE: KORSGAARD AND WOOD ON KANT’S FORMULA OF HUMANITY CHRISTOPHER ARROYO Abstract: This essay examines two interpretations of Kant’s argument for the formula of humanity. Her thesis relies on the reflective capacity of our minds which enables us to come up with a self-conception, or identity in which our principles and values are reflected. If ethically good action is simply rational action, we do not need to postulate special ethical properties in the world or faculties in the mind, in order to provide ethics with a foundation. source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal arbitrariness. In brief, Korsgaard attempts to demonstrate that people who value anything incur moral obligations. Christine Korsgaard tells a different story about the sine qua non conditions of having reasons. Christine Korsgaard identifies and examines four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers, and shows how Kant's autonomy-based account emerges as a synthesis of the other three.
PROLOGUE Excellence and obligation a very concise history of western metaphysics 387 BC to 1887 AD Christine Korsgaard One should guard against thinking lightly of [the bad con-science] merely on account of its initial painfulness and ugli-ness. This book presents an account of the foundation of practical reason and moral obligation. Christine Korsgaard is concerned with what justifies the claims morality makes on us; that is, the normative question.
BRATMAN Stanford University This book derives from the 1992 Tanner Lectures and Seminar in Cambridge, England. Christine Korsgaard’s 1996 book, The Sources of Normativity, attracted a great deal of attention.
In the reading of The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard discusses four basic theories for the justification of morality: Voluntarism, Realism, Reflective Endorsement, and the Appeal to Autonomy. She continues this project, in later works, with a more explicit focus upon the nature of agency. Now, moral normativity depends upon us and our being able to use practical reason. Articles (1986) "Skepticism about Practical Reason," The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1): 5-25. The tests of normativity that Baier and Korsgaard claim to find in Hume revolve around the concept of reflection or reflexivity. Korsgaard’s argument for constitutivism has two variants, one discussed in her 1996 book The Sources of Normativity and the other in her recent Self-constitution, of 2009.